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I. INTRODUCTION

The U.S. Supreme Court's 2005 decision in Kelo v. City of
New London, ConnecticutI sent shockwaves through state
legislatures across the nation. The decision allowed a Connecticut
municipality to use eminent domain to redevelop a non-blighted
residential area in partnership with a private developer. 2 Though
the decision was hardly the earth-shaking result that many
unfamiliar with existing law believed,3 public outcry was swift.
Since Kelo, forty-seven state legislatures have considered
legislation to redefine their eminent domain laws.4
Historically, Louisiana state and local governments have
displayed caution in exercising their expropriation powers.' Yet,
Louisiana reacted to Kelo with three rigid constitutional
amendments that would be difficult to repeal if found unworkable.
One of Louisiana's amendments (hereinafter "Amendment 5",),6
which passed by popular vote on September 30, 2006, 7 (1) forbids
government from taking property "for predominant use by" or
"transfer of ownership to any private person or entity"; (2)
narrowly defines "public purpose" as either "a general public right
to a definite use of the property," a public ownership of land
designated for specific enumerated uses, or a removal of a threat to
public health or safety; and (3) forbids government from
considering economic development, tax revenues, or any incidental
Copyright 2008, by LOUISIANA LAW REvIEw.
1. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Kate Moran, Amendment Limits Use of ExpropriationPowers,
TIMES-PICAYUNE (New Orleans), Sept. 27, 2006, at Al.
4. See infra Part II.C.
5. See infra Part II.D. "Expropriation" is the civil law equivalent to the
common law "eminent domain."
6. The amendment was labeled "Constitutional Amendment No. 5" on the
September 30, 2006 ballot. See HOUSE LEGISLATIVE SERVS., LA. HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENTS FOR CONSIDERATION IN

2006 3 (2006), http://www.legis.state.la.us/election2006/06amendments.pdf
[hereinafter 2006 AMENDMENTS].
7. See Louisiana Secretary of State Official Election Results, Results for
Election Date: 9/30/06, http://www.sos.louisiana.gov:8090/cgibin/?rqstyp=
elcinq&rqsdta=start (query "Amendments & Multi-Parish Propositions" for
"9/30/06" election results) [hereinafter Election Results].
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benefit to the public in determining whether the taking is for a
public purpose.8 Amendment 5, in conjunction with two other
amendments passed along with it, 9 ranks as one of the most
aggressive reactions to Kelo taken by any state;' 0 it changes current
Louisiana law drastically 1 and comes at a time when vast
devastation remains
across South Louisiana following Hurricanes
12
Katrina and Rita.
Amendment 5 is poorly drafted. It fails in its mission to
protect property owners because it includes contradictory and
overbroad exceptions yet succeeds in constraining one of the most
basic and essential functions of government: economic
development. 13 Economic development is an essential policy of
government because stimulating the economy increases the
public's wealth. If the provisions in Amendment 5 are interpreted
wrongly, Louisiana's economic future could suffer.
The
amendment has the potential to quash the government's Takings
Power in many instances where it would be necessary and good for
the state, such as during the hurricane recovery effort.
This Comment argues that Amendment 5's purpose is to codify
Justice O'Connor's dissenting opinion in Kelo. Justice O'Connor
contended that eminent domain should not be used for a purely
economic purpose when property is transferred to a private person
because the sovereign would in effect be taking property from one
party for transfer to a higher taxpayer.' 4 She did not, however,
support depriving government of its ability to involve private
parties in remedying affirmative harms in the community. This
8.

2006 La. Acts No. 851, reprintedinfra app.

9. "Constitutional Amendment Nos. 4 and 6" on the September, 30, 2006
ballot also change expropriation law in Louisiana. See 2006 AMENDMENTS,
supra note 6, at 3-4. Amendment 4 reduces the compensation awarded in a
taking from compensation "to the fullest extent" to "just compensation" if the
property is taken for hurricane protection. 2006 La. Acts No. 853. Amendment
6 requires that any property taken be offered back to the owner before sale or
lease to a private party. 2006 La. Acts No. 859.
10. See infra Part II.C.
11. See infra Part 111.
12. Expropriation is "a tool that many expected to be used to reinvent
neighborhoods devastated by Hurricane Katrina." Moran, supra note 3.
13. See infra Part IV.
14. See infra Part II.B.
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Comment concludes, then, that Amendment 5's "predominant use"
provision should be read to limit the purpose of the taking, not its
mechanism; that the "threat to public health or safety" exception
should be applied broadly; and that the "economic development"
and "incidental benefits" limitations should be read narrowly.
These recommendations would satisfy concerns raised by Justice
O'Connor without greatly affecting Louisiana's economic future.
Part II of this Comment details the historical and legislative
contexts in which Amendment 5 was drafted. It discusses the
history of the Takings Power under the Federal Constitution, the
Kelo decision, and the subsequent reaction to Kelo by other states.
Part II(D) then discusses the parallel history under the Louisiana
Constitution and supporting statutes leading up to the drafting of
Amendment 5. Part III discusses the text of Amendment 5 and its
potential effects on property rights, economic development, and on
current hurricane recovery efforts. Finally, Part IV analyzes the
issues mentioned in Part III and recommends sound judicial
interpretations for the several provisions of the amendment that
would protect property owners without inhibiting hurricane
economic development
recovery plans or other well-planned
15
efforts in Louisiana's future.

15. Though they are many, this Comment does not analyze issues
surrounding compensation awarded for expropriated property. See 2006 La.
Acts No. 851 (amending LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5)) (expanding compensation
"to the full extent of [the owner's] loss," to include "all costs of relocation,
inconvenience and any other damages"); 2006 La. Acts No. 853 (amending LA.
CONST. art. I, § 4(H)) (limiting compensation for property taken for hurricane
protection construction to that which is required under the federal Fifth
Amendment Takings Clause); see also Mark Davis, A Whole New Ballgame:
Coastal Restoration, Storm Protection,and the Legal Landscape After Katrina,
68 LA. L. REv. 419 (2008) (discussing the impact of this compensation scheme
dichotomy on rebuilding coastal area protection following the hurricanes);
Letter to the Editor, Charles E. Soileau, ProposalCould Bankrupt Government,
THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Sept. 21, 2006, at B10 (arguing that
Amendment 6's compensation scheme will cost state and local governments
many millions of dollars more for even the most traditional takings).
This Comment also does not discuss the potential implications of Amendment
6's right of first refusal requirement, which could be considerable. See 2006 La.
Acts No. 859 (amending LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(G)). The provision is presented
in some detail in a companion article in this issue, John J. Costonis, Two Years
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II.BACKGROUND
A. History of the FederalPublic Use Clause
1. The Founding andPurpose of Eminent Domain
For centuries, government has exercised the power of eminent
domain to take privately-owned property for the greater good. 16 It
is, in essence, government's power to compel the sale of property
at a fair price when the sale is in the interest of the public. 17 This
power has long been considered inherent in and necessary to a
sovereign's existence' and paramount to all private rights, because
the right of the individual must not supersede the needs of the
whole. 19
When property is needed for the greater economic good,
eminent domain is the tool the sovereign uses to combat the
"holdout." 20 The holdout is the individual property owner who sits
on the site of a planned public project and, realizing his sudden
bargaining power, resists sale in an effort to gain a higher-thanmarket price for his property. 2 1 This tactic effectively puts money
in the pocket of the individual when it should be spent on the
public at large. For example, a sovereign may need land to build a
road. Landowners in the path of the planned road could hold out
sale until the government has paid exorbitant sums for the needed
land. Public funds are in this way transferred unnecessarily to

and Counting: Land Use and Louisiana's Post-Katrina Recovery, 68 LA. L.

REv. 349, 379-80 (2008).
16.

See generally Scott Ledet, Comment, The Kelo Effect: Eminent Domain

and PropertyRights in Louisiana,67 LA. L. REV. 171, 178-79 (2006).
17. 29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 3.
18. United States v. Lynah, 188 U.S. 445 (1903); Kohl v. United States, 91
U.S. 367 (1875); W. River Bridge Co. v. Dix, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 507 (1848).
19. W.River Bridge, 47 U.S. at 531-32. The eminent domain power should
therefore be exercised with great caution. Orleans-Kenner Electric Ry. Co. v.
Metairie Ridge Nursery Co., 68 So. 93, 95 (La. 1915).
20.

See, e.g., R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW §§ 3.6 to .7 (3d ed.

1986).
21. Id.
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private pockets in the interest of public need. Eminent domain
prevents this scenario.
2. The Limitations on Eminent Domain
Because the eminent domain power is inherent and necessary
for a sovereign, it requires no constitutional recognition.22 Thus
the power is not granted by the Federal Constitution but is limited
in the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause, which states, "private
property [shall
not] be taken for public use, without just
compensation.''23 The clause invokes two requirements: (1)that
the taking serves a "public use," and (2) that just compensation is
paid to the owner. 24 This section explores the question: what is
"public use" in federal law?
An early constraint to public use was recognized in Calder v.
Bull, where Justice Chase opined that "a law that takes property
from A and gives it to B: It is against all reason and justice, for a
people to entrust a Legislature with SUCH powers; and, therefore,
it cannot be presumed that they have done it."' 25 This reasoning
suggests that public use must involve use by more than a single
private party but does not expound further on the requirement. 26 A
look at subsequent federal case history reveals three applications of
public use that have been found constitutional: "public ownership,"
"use by the public," and a third more recent, but generally accepted
27
application, "public purpose."

22. People v. Adirondack Ry. Co., 176 U.S. 335, 346-47 (1900); U.S. v.
Jones, 109 U.S. 513 (1883); Boom Co. v. Patterson, 98 U.S. 403 (1878).
23. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
24. Kelo v. City of New London, Conn., 545 U.S. 469, 495-96 (O'Connor,
J., dissenting) (citing Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 231-32
(2003)).
25. 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 386, 388 (1798).
26. The restriction set out in Calder is still good law today. See, e.g., Kelo,
545 U.S. at 478 & n.5 (majority opinion); but see id.at 494 (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
27. Id. at 497-98.
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a. TraditionalPublic Uses
The oldest and most established public use application is
66 ownership. ,28 That is, the government
"public
may take land from
a private citizen and convert it to publicly-owned property such as
a road, a school, or a park.2 9 This application requires that
ownership of the property be transferred to the public.
In the nineteenth century, a second public use application
developed when private entities called "common carriers" began
30
stepping in to perform certain functions in place of government.
Under this "use by the public" application, the government takes
property and transfers it to these common carriers, such as railroad
or utility companies, who then convert it to property available for
use by the public, in such forms as railroads, oil pipelines, or
electrical infrastructure. 3 1 Although the property must be made
available to the public, the common carriers maintain ownership.
This public use application may be characterized as a2Public
right
3
utility.
specific
a
for
property
the
to
access
to physical
The first major problem with the "use by the public"
application revealed itself in the Mill Acts cases, 33 in which private
mill owners were given authority to flood upstream properties
34
(after paying just compensation) in the interest of creating dams.
The Mill Acts were essential to manufacturers dependent on water
power and beneficial to the public in effect, but did not fit the
existing public use test because the public did not physically use
the flooded property. 35 These and later cases illustrated the
28. Id.(citing Old Dominion Land Co. v. U.S., 269 U.S. 55 (1925); Rindge
Co. v. County of Los Angeles, 262 U.S. 700 (1923)).

29. Id.
30. Id.(citing Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Boston & Me. Corp., 503 U.S.
407 (1992); Mt. Vernon-Woodberry Cotton Duck Co. v. Ala. Interstate Power

Co., 240 U.S. 30 (1916)).
31. Id.
32. Id.at 513 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
33. See, e.g., Chase v. Sutton Mfg. Co., 58 Mass. (4 Cush.) 152 (Mass.
1849).
34. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476-77 & n.8 (majority opinion) (citing Philip
Nichols, Jr., The Meaning of Public Use in the Law of Eminent Domain, 20 B.U.
L. REV. 615, 619-24 (1940)).
35. Id.
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shortcomings of such a narrow public use interpretation to
accommodate the "evolving needs of society., 36 Thus, in the
following century, the traditional public use restrictions gave
way
37
purpose."
"public
as
to
referred
limitation,
broader
third,
to a
b. PublicPurpose
"Public purpose" may be characterized as a general benefit to
the public's welfare.38 The public purpose application naturally
extends from the use by the public application because it allows
government to use eminent domain to transfer property to one or
more private entities, who are not necessarily common carriers, but
who still make use of the property in a way that is beneficial to the
public at large. 39 Two U.S. Supreme Court cases in the twentieth
century, Berman v. Parker4° and Hawaii Housing Authority v.
Midkiff,4' demonstrate the public purpose application.
In Berman, Congress passed a statute authorizing local officials
in Washington, D.C. to take a blighted neighborhood and
redevelop it. 42 Though the redevelopment would not necessarily
make the entire property available for physical use by the public,
the city cited dilapidated housing, overcrowded dwellings, and
43
public health concerns as public purposes behind the taking.
Plaintiff brought an action against the city because the
36. Id.at 476. See also Ledet, supra note 16, at 178-79.
37. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476-77 ("Thus, in a case upholding a mining
company's use of an aerial bucket line to transport ore over property it did not
own, Justice Holmes' opinion for the Court stressed 'the inadequacy of use by
the general public as a universal test.'... We have repeatedly and consistently
rejected that narrow test ever since." (citing Strickley v. Highland Boy Gold
Mining Co., 200 U.S. 527 (1906))).
38. See Haw. Hous. Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229 (1984); Berman v.
Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
39. See, e.g., Kelo, 545 U.S. at 476 (allowing a taking in a case where "the
City is [not] planning to open the condemned land-at least not in its entiretyto use by the general public . . . [n]or will the private lessees of the land in any
sense be required to operate like common carriers, making their services
available to all comers").
40. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).

41.

467 U.S. 229 (1984).

42.
43.

Kelo, 545 U.S. at 497 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id.(citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 30, 34).
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redevelopmentplan included his department store, which itself was
not "blighted."'4 The Supreme Court in Berman upheld the taking
of the plaintiffs non-blighted property pursuant to a plan of
general urban renewal in the surrounding neighborhood. This
holding set three important precedents. First, it allowed for a
blighted neighborhood to be taken for redevelopment even when
45
the condemned lands may be sold or leased to private interests.

Second, it emphasized deference to legislatures in determining
what constituted a "public purpose. 4 6 Third, it established that a
sovereign may evaluate a region as a whole, and not individual
properties therein, to determine if the region needs redeveloping.47
Later, in Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkif,48 the Court
affirmed the legislative-deference approach outlined in Berman by
upholding a Hawaii statute that transferred titles from lessors to
lessees (for just compensation) for the public purpose of reducing a
severe concentration of land ownership. 49 At the time, ninety-six
44. Id. The District of Columbia Redevelopment Act of 1945, which
authorized the taking in Berman, did not define "blight." See, e.g., Brief for
Appellants at 13-14, Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (No. 22). The City argued that the
word has no consistent definition (perhaps for good reason), but offered
generally that a blighted area possesses physical characteristics such as
"dilapidated, substandard, and worn out dwellings," unsanitary facilities,
crowding, inadequate light and air, and conditions conducive to the spread of
disease, and that blighted areas generally cause economic losses on those
property owners within them and on the community as a whole. Brief for Renah
F. Camalier & Louis W. Prentiss, Commissioners of the District of Columbia,
Appellees at 2-3, 7-8, Berman, 348 U.S. 26 (No. 22).
45. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 498.
46. Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34 ("It is within the power of the legislature to
determine that the community should be beautiful as well as healthy, spacious as
well as clean, well-balanced as well as carefully patrolled ....

Here one of the

means [to these ends] chosen is the use of private enterprise for redevelopment
of the area. .

.

. The public end may be as well or better served through an

agency of private enterprise than through a department of government-or so
the Congress might conclude.").
47. Kelo, 545 U.S. at 499 (O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("[W]e did not secondguess [Congress'] decision to treat the neighborhood as a whole rather than lotby-lot." (citing Berman, 348 U.S. at 34-35)).
48. 467 U.S. 229 (1984).
49. Id. at 242-43 ("When the legislature's purpose is legitimate and its
means are not irrational,.... empirical debates over the wisdom of takings ...

are not to be carried out in the federal courts.").
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percent of Hawaii's privately-owned land was owned by only a
handful of landowners who inflated land prices and thus "injur[ed]
the public tranquility and welfare." 50
The state and local
authorities believed that invoking the power of eminent domain
was the only effective method of combating the existing
oligopoly. 5 1

A unanimous Court, led by Justice O'Connor,

declined to "substitute its judgment for a legislature's judgment as
to what constitutes a public use 'unless the use be palpably without
reasonable foundation.' 52 Since the statute in Midkiff reasonably
benefited the public at large
by freeing the residential market, the
5
it.
upset
to
Court declined
In both Berman and Midkiff, opponents argued that the takings
effectively allowed government to take property from A for the
sole benefit of private party B in violation of the "rule" established
long ago in Calder v. Bull.54

The Court disagreed in both

instances.55 It held that as long as the Court finds the benefit
associated with the taking is not limited to "a particular class of
identifiable individuals," a sovereign may transfer property to
another private party in an eminent domain taking.56 Thus, the
Court carved out for itself the limited role of judging whether the
taking's benefit stretches beyond the private party to the taking,
concerning
itself not with the "mechanics" of the taking but with
5
its effect.
Leading up to the Kelo decision in 2005, then, the federal
eminent domain power had involved transfer to private parties for
a variety of purposes. Notably, neither Berman nor Midkiff
50. Id. at 232.
51. Id. at233.
52. Id. at 241 (quoting United States v. Gettysburg Elec. R. Co., 160 U.S.
668, 680 (1896)).
53. Id
54. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text; Midkiff, 467 U.S. at
239-45; Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-34.
55. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 239-45; Berman, 348 U.S. at 33-36.
56. Midkiff, 467 U.S. at 245.
57. Id. at 244. By "mechanics" the Court refers to the means by which the
government chooses to effect the public benefit. Id. In Midkiff, the
"mechanism" was transferring property titles from lessor to lessee. Id. In
Berman, the "mechanism" was creating a redevelopment plan and employing a
private developer to implement it. 348 U.S. at 33-36.
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prompted significant negative public reaction. The discrepancy in
the public reactions to Berman and Midkiff versus the public outcry
following Kelo suggests that some element of the facts or the
holding in Kelo was offensive to the public in a way that the facts
and holdings in Berman and Midkiff were not. The following
section outlines the Kelo decision, its facts and argument, and
endeavors to explore why it incited such an explosive public
response.
B. The Kelo v. City of New London 58 Decision
Kelo involved a "public-private taking., 59 Ms. Susette Kelo
and her co-plaintiffs resided in a region of New London,
Connecticut that was the subject of a comprehensive
redevelopment plan proposed by the city in conjunction with a new
Pfizer research facility to be built on adjacent property.6" The
region, which had suffered tax revenue and population declines,
had been designated a "distressed municipality," though not
"blighted."'"
Though parts of the redevelopment included
publicly-owned space such as a park, museum, and river walk,
other parts included private space such as offices, a shopping
district, and a hotel. 62 The city created a private, non-profit entity
(the New London Development Corporation or "NLDC") to plan
and execute the redevelopment. 63 It cited economic revitalization,

58. 545 U.S. 469 (2005).
59. Id. As used herein, a "public-private taking" means a taking in which
the government takes the property through eminent domain, then transfers title
or leases it to a private entity which redevelops the area according to the
government's regulations. Since Berman, these kinds of partnerships have been
commonplace. See infra Part IV.
60. Id. at 473-75.
61. Id. at 473. This is arguably the only factual distinction between Berman
in 1954 and Kelo in 2005. It raises the question, if New London had designated
the region surrounding Ms. Kelo's home as "blighted" (though that term
traditionally has maintained no consistent definition, see supra note 44), would
the public still have reacted as severely to the Kelo outcome?
62. Id. at 474; id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 473 (majority opinion); id. at 495 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
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job creation, increases in tax revenue, and maximizing
64 public
access to its waterfront as public purposes for the taking.
Ms. Kelo and her co-plaintiffs owned well-kept, middle income
65
homes, some of which had been in their families for generations.
They argued that economic development and tax revenues, in
themselves, are not "public uses" under the Fifth Amendment
Takings Clause. 6 6 The Court disagreed in a 5-4 decision.
Following the precedents established in Berman and Midkiff, the
Court deferred to the city's finding that economic development
served a public purpose in this case. 67 The Court did not, as
perhaps much of the public believed, stretch the definition of
public purpose to include public-private development. That was
done over fifty years earlier in Berman.
Justice Stevens wrote for a majority which included Justices
Ginsburg, Souter, Kennedy, and Breyer. 68 The majority affirmed
that under no circumstance may property be taken from A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to B but did not find such a transfer
in Kelo.69 Instead, it reiterated its pattern of "affording legislatures
broad latitude in determining what public needs justify the use of
the takings power.",70 The majority supported the wisdom of this
approach by pointing out the changing needs of society and the
intimacy with which these needs are connected with their
particular localities. 7 1 The Court gave great weight to the thorough
investigation and intensive planning project undertaken by the
local authorities to determine that the redevelopment was in the
public's best interest and was not beneficial to any single class of

64. Id.at 478 n.6 (majority opinion).
65. Id.at 475; id.at 494 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
66. Id.at 475 (majority opinion); id.at 495-96 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
67. Id.at 476-89 (majority opinion).
68. Id.at 470.
69. Id. at 477. The majority declined to establish "a bright-line rule" that
would prevent "a city from transferring citizen A's property to citizen B for the
sole reason that citizen B will put the property to a more productive use." Id.at
486-87. If such a one-to-one transfer did ever occur, it "would certainly raise a
suspicion that a private purpose was afoot." Id.; see also id.n. 17.
70. Id.at 483.
71. Id. at 482-83 (citing Hairston v. Danville & W. Ry. Co., 208 U.S. 598
(1908)).
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persons.
Finally, the majority invited any state legislature to
impose stricter "public use"73 requirements in its own laws if it
found this holding troubling.
Justice Kennedy, in concurrence with the majority, attempted
to set a test for when a court should rule against the legislature in
eminent domain cases.7 4 He opined that a court must "strike down
a taking that, by a clear showing, is intended to favor a particular
75
private party, with only incidental or pretextual public benefits."
Particularly for a public-private taking, Justice Kennedy argued, a
court must ensure the economic advantage it brings to the public is
not "incidental to the benefits that will be confined on private
parties" to the development.76
Many who disagreed with Kelo's majority aligned themselves
with Justice O'Connor's dissent. Justice O'Connor, writing for
Justices Rehnquist, Thomas, and Scalia, argued that the majority
shirked its judicial responsibility by not drawing a distinction
between public need and public betterment. 77 She argued that the
incidental public benefits in the Kelo taking "such as increased tax
revenue, more jobs, [and] maybe even aesthetic pleasure" are
insufficient to constitute "public uses. 78
She distinguished
Berman and Midkiff by reasoning that the takings in both of those
79
cases were necessary to combat an "affirmative harm on society.,
72. Id. at 484. Petitioners had argued that the New London development
primarily benefited Pfizer, but "[e]ven the dissenting justices on the Connecticut
Supreme Court agreed that respondents' development plan was intended to
revitalize the local economy, not to serve the interests of Pfizer." Id. at 492
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (citing Kelo v. New London, Conn., 843 A.2d 500,
595 (Conn. 2004) (Zarella, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
73. Id. at 489 (majority opinion). This language may be what signaled state
legislatures and the media to come to attention over eminent domain law.
74. Id.at 491 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id. at 497-505 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). She argued that the majority
blurred the line between the state's police power, which allows the state to
protect the public's health, safety, and welfare, and eminent domain's "public
use" requirement. Id. at 501.
78. Id.at 497-505.
79. Id.at 500 ("in Berman through blight resulting from extreme poverty
and in Midkiff through oligopoly resulting from extreme wealth"); but see id.at
486 n.16 (majority opinion).
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Thus, in order to find a public purpose correlative to a publicprivate taking, Justice O'Connor would require a public harm for
which the taking serves as a necessary remedy. She did not
condemn economic development as a public purpose; she80 merely
disparaged it as the sole public purpose justifying a taking.
The Kelo decision did little to change federal eminent domain
law. It simply affirmed a line of cases that began generations ago
with Berman and added, if anything, that public purposes may be
purely economic. However, economic development has long been
a recognized and important function of government. For this
reason, the national public outcry is peculiar. Perhaps the public
agreed with Justice O'Connor that an affirmative harm must be
present before government can exercise eminent domain. Perhaps
the public identified with Ms. Kelo and her newly renovated
oceanfront home and would impose a harsher limit on takings of
residential properties. Perhaps the public, like Justice Thomas,
would prefer to ignore a hundred years of jurisprudence and
eliminate eminent domain for all but literal public use takings. All
told, something about Ms. Kelo's plight struck a chord with the
American public and incited perhaps the most far-reaching public
reaction to a Supreme Court decision in recent history.8 '
C. States'Reactions to Kelo

Forty-seven states considered legislation in reaction to Kelo.82
Following the 2006 regular sessions, twenty-eight states including
80. Justice Thomas wrote a lengthy dissenting opinion that pleaded for the
Court to read "public use" literally and to abandon the "public purpose" doctrine
it has applied for the last century. Id. at 505-23 (Thomas, J., dissenting). As
Part II.D of this Comment explains, the Louisiana Constitution uses the "public
purpose" language as opposed to the more narrow "public use" clause. For this
reason, Justice Thomas' dissent is less relevant to analyzing expropriation law in
Louisiana.
81. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3 ("'It has only been 15 months since Kelo
came down, and to have this many states take this much action so quickly is
fairly unprecedented,' said Larry Morandi, director of state policy research at
the National Conference of State Legislatures.").
82. Kevin McCarthy, OLR Research Report: Recently Enacted Eminent
Domain Laws, July 6, 2006, available at http://www.cga.ct.gov/2006/rpt/2006R-0394.htm.
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Louisiana passed some type of legislation amending their eminent
domain laws. 83 The laws fall generally into seven categories.
They:
(1) limit or prohibit eminent domain for economic
development;
(2) limit economic development takings of blighted
areas;
(3) restrict the definitions of "public purpose" or
"public use";
(4) employ procedural safeguards against eminent
domain abuse;
(5) award more than just compensation for a taking;
(6) establish rights of first refusal to the owner of the
taken property; or
(7) place a moratorium on eminent domain use for
and create an investigatory
economic development 84
task force in the interim.
Almost all of these states passed flexible statutes, as opposed to
more rigid constitutional amendments. 85 Only six states, including
Louisiana, enacted constitutional amendments in reaction to
Kelo,86 and of these amendments, only three employ changes
Michigan's amendment
arguably as drastic as Louisiana's.
prohibits economic development takings altogether and requires
governments to show by clear and convincing evidence that a
targeted area is blighted; New Hampshire's amendment also
prohibits takings for private development; and South Carolina's
amendment prohibits purely economic takings except for

83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3 ("'For the most part, states did not choose
the constitutional amendment route because they are not real clear on what the
implications of their actions might be,' said Morandi of the National Conference
of State Legislatures. 'A lot of states are saying we need to do something, but
let's not lock it into the constitution just yet. Let's do a statutory change so if
things happen we did not anticipate, we can change the statute.')
86. Castle Coalition, 2006 Election Wrap Up, http://www.castlecoalition.
com/media/releases/I 1806pr.html.
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traditional public uses and defines blight as a threat to public
health and safety.87
Louisiana passed three constitutional amendments in reaction
to Kelo, including Amendment 5. By comparison, Louisiana's
reaction to Kelo is most similar to South Carolina's because
Amendment 5 prohibits purely economic takings altogether and
any takings for use by or transfer to private entities, except when
the taking is for an industrial purpose. 88 It also limits public
purpose to traditional public uses and the removal of threats to
public health or safety.
However, Louisiana also employed additional safeguards that
even South Carolina did not. Louisiana's Amendment 5 increases
the required compensation for taken property to include "all costs
of relocation, inconvenience and any other damnages''9° a
compensation scheme that far exceeds those of most other state
laws-unless the property is taken for hurricane protection
construction as stipulated in Amendment 4 of the 2006
Constitutional Amendments. 9'
Additionally, Amendment 6
requires that any surplus
property
be
offered back to the original
92
value.
market
at
owner
Thus, Louisiana succeeded in passing a collection of
amendments that together make up the most drastic reaction to
Kelo taken by any state. The amendments employ all of the seven
tactics implemented by other states except the moratorium and the
procedural safeguards. 93 Yet, as the next section shows, Louisiana
had already employed effective procedural safeguards against
expropriation abuse and an increased compensation scheme.
Therefore Louisiana arguably needed no Kelo reaction at all. The
following section explores the history of expropriation in
Louisiana leading up to the firestorm following Kelo and explains
87. McCarthy, supra note 82. Florida and Georgia are the final two states
that enacted constitutional amendments in reaction to Kelo. They both allow
public-private takings with approval of elected officials. Id.
88. 2006 La. Acts No. 851, reprintedinfra app.

89.
90.
91.
92.

Id.
Id.
2006 La. Acts No. 853.
2006 La. Acts No. 859.

93. See supra Part IL.C,

1.
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why a drastic and rigid package of constitutional amendments in
Louisiana may have been a mistake, especially
considering the
94
reality.
post-hurricane
its
belying
uncertainties
D. History of Expropriationin Louisiana
Louisiana's expropriation power developed independently
from the federal power. Since 1921, Louisiana has not bound its
expropriation power to the federal "public use" standard but has
instead applied the broader "public purpose" standard. 95 Because
the federal courts had in essence applied the same standard by that
time,96 the courts' interpretations of Louisiana's public purpose
clause paralleled that of the federal courts thereafter. 97 However,
Louisiana employed certain additional mechanisms to keep its
expropriation power in check, including statutory procedural
safeguards and increased compensation schemes. These have been
effective in limiting the use of expropriation in Louisiana.
Three safeguards have been particularly effective in preventing
expropriation abuse in Louisiana. First, the 1974 Constitution
requires that a taking by a private entity, such as a common carrier,
must be for a "public and necessary purpose." 98 Because public-

94. Conspicuously absent from the Kelo-reactors is Mississippi, who sits in
a similar post-Katrina posture as Louisiana. It did not react to Kelo in its 2005
or 2006 legislative sessions, partially because of these uncertainties.
95. "Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to the
owner or into court for his benefit." LA. CONST. art. I, § 2 (1921) (emphasis
added).
96. See supraPart II.A.
97. The only difference, of course, was that Louisiana courts did not
struggle with the competing "public use" interpretations as did the federal
courts. See, for example, Justice Thomas' dissent in Kelo, discussed supra note
80.
98. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1974) ("Property shall not be taken or damaged
by the state or its political subdivisions except for public purposes and with just
compensation paid to the owner or into court for his benefit. Property shall not
be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized by law to expropriate,
except for a public and necessary purpose and with just compensation paid to
the owner; in such proceedings, whether the purpose is public and necessary
shall be a judicial question .... (emphasis added)); see also W. Lee Hargrave,
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private takings usually involve benefits to the private entity as well
as the public, the heightened standard balances the potential for
abuse.
Second, the constitution awards the owner of taken property
compensation "to the full extent of his loss," as opposed to the
federal "just compensation" award, and grants him a request for a
jury trial to determine compensation. 99
State courts have
interpreted this last clause to include attorneys' fees, relocation
expenses, and other incidental costs to the property owner: a
compensation scheme00 that far exceeds the federal standard and that
of most other states.'
Third, a governing authority is statutorily required to approve
any taking by a municipal corporation before it can proceed. 1 1
This requirement has been particularly effective in preventing
expropriation abuse in Louisiana because the local elected officials
are well aware that expropriating their constituents' private
0 2
property, when not absolutely necessary, costs them their jobs.'

The Declarationof Rights of the Louisiana Constitution of 1974, 35 LA. L. REV.
1, 17 (1974).
99. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4 (1974) ("In every expropriation, a party has the
right to trial by jury to determine compensation, and the owner shall be
compensated to the full extent of his loss.").
100. See e.g., State, Dept. of Transp. and Dev. v. Dietrich, 555 So. 2d 1355,
1358 (La. 1990) ("[F]ull compensation should include moving costs, costs to
relocate, inconvenience, and loss of profits from takings of business premises.
Where economic losses suffered by a business have been proven, damages for
incidental and consequential loss must be awarded to fully compensate the
owner." (footnote omitted)); State v. Constant, 369 So. 2d 699, 702 (La. 1979)
("[An owner [must] be put in as good a position pecuniarily as he would have
been had his property not been taken.").
101. "Where a price cannot be agreed upon with the owner, any municipal
corporation of Louisiana may expropriate property whenever such a course is
determined to be necessary for the public interest by the governing authority of
the municipality ... ." LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 19:102. "Governing authority"
means "the body which exercises the legislative functions of the political
subdivision"-either the city council or the police jury presiding over the
municipality in which the taking occurs. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 44.
102. See, e.g., Archived Broadcasts of House of Representatives Civil Law
Committee Meeting, May 2, 2006, at 3:26, http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/
Ram/RamMay06/0502-06_CLP.ram
[hereinafter Civil Law Committee
Meeting, May 2] (testimony of Dan Garrett, Police Jury Association of
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Because of these safeguards, expropriation in Louisiana is
rarely employed and used by municipalities strictly as a last resort.
It has not been abused.' 1 3 In the 2006 legislative session, the
legislature reviewed expropriation cases over the previous century
and found only three that involved a public-private taking for a
partially economic purpose: Boardof CommissionersNew Orleans
10 4
Exhibition Hall Authority v. Missouri Pacific Railroad Co.;
Town of Vidalia v. Unopened Succession
of Ruffin; 10 5 and City of
06
1
Corp.
Gas
Shreveport v. Chanse
The New Orleans Exhibition Hall Authority ("NOEHA") case
was the first case in the state in which economic development was
cited as the purpose for the taking. 1°7 The taking involved
commercial property for a New Orleans Convention Center
expansion, and the landowner was a highly sophisticated developer
whose principal complaint was the compensation the city
offered. ls The NOEHA, being a private entity, was required to
prove both public necessity and public purpose before the court

Louisiana) ("Anybody who has ever been at a city council meeting or a police
jury meeting when you've got a vote to expropriate property (for any reason...
to fix a road that's a death trap), it's still an unbelievably difficult vote .... The
situation you run into is you never get to the court of appeals because.., if you
have to take somebody's house, that's a big deal . . . . Those local elected
officials feel that more than you can possibly believe, because they're casting
that vote with those [property owners] sitting ten feet away from them.")
103. The Institute for Justice in Arlington, Virginia defines eminent domain
"abuse" as eminent domain that is used "for private, economic development."
Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 2:31-:32 (statement
by Scott Bullock, Institute for Justice). The Institute represented the plaintiffs in
the Kelo case before the U.S. Supreme Court and has played a principal role in
crafting the reactive state legislation. Id. Scott Bullock of the Institute helped to
craft Louisiana's amendment language. Id. Yet, the Institute itself admits
"Louisiana has been relatively modest in its use of eminent domain for private
parties." DANA BERLINER, CASTLE COALITION, PUBLIC POWER, PRIVATE GAIN:
A FIVE-YEAR STATE-BY-STATE REPORT EXAMINING THE ABUSE OF EMINENT
DOMAIN 86-88 (2003), available at http://www.castlecoalition.org/pdf/report/
ED-report.pdf.
104. 625 So. 2d 1070 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1993).
105. 663 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1995).
106. 794 So. 2d 962 (La. App. 2d Cir. 2001).
107. 625 So. 2d 1070.
108. Id.
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would grant the taking. The court acknowledged NOEHA's
"public purpose of promoting economic growth and development
of the area," and did not question it. 109 The taking proceeded.
The Town of Vidalia court weighed the question of whether a
development aimed at economic revitalization was a valid public
purpose in Louisiana. l 10 Like Kelo, the mixed-use development
plan in Vidalia included (1) a hotel and retail center, (2) a marina
and boat ramp, (3) an outdoor theater, (4) a river walk, (5) a
visitors' center and ferry terminal, and (6) a park with
landscaping."' Defendants in the Vidalia case were co-owners in
12
an unopened succession of what amounted to a half-acre of land."
They did not live or conduct business on the land at the time of the
taking, and they too were principally concerned with the
compensation awarded."l 3 The court defined a public purpose as
"any allocation to a use resulting in advantages to the public at
large" and because the townspeople of Vidalia supported it,
granted leave for the taking. 114
Economic development as a public purpose was again
contested and affirmed in Chanse Gas.i 5 The city sought to take
property for the purpose of building a convention center and
adjacent hotel by the river. 1 6 The main purpose cited for the
development was economic growth.' i7 The property owners in the
Chanse Gas case were large corporations who had put the land up
for sale until the city expressed interest then raised the price,
seemingly to take advantage of the state's generous expropriation
compensation scheme.'
The court discussed the federal
precedents in Berman and Midkiff and the state precedents in
NOEHA and Vidalia, to conclude that "economic development, in

109. Id.at 1074-75.
110. 663 So. 2d 315. The plaintiffs also cited historical, educational, and
recreational benefits to the public. Id. at 317-19.
111. Id.
112. Id.at316.
113. Id.
114. Id.at319.
115. 794 So. 2dat971.
116. Id at 966-67.
117. Id.at 967-68.
118. 1d.at 971,967.
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the form of a convention center and headquarters hotel, satisfied
the public purposes and public necessity requirements of Art. 1, §
4 and R.S. 19:102. '"1 9 The court further argued that even the
legislature has expressed that economic development is a valid
public purpose.
The ensuing development was universally
believed to be a good one that brought about positive economic
impact in the area. '21
These three cases illustrate that "public purpose" has not been
defined differently in Louisiana than in federal case law leading up
to Kelo, but unlike the Federal Constitution, Louisiana employs
other safeguards to ensure that expropriation is used sparingly.
Perhaps because of these safeguards, even when expropriation has
been used for public-private takings in this state, it has been met
with public approval. The predominant issues in these cases
involved not "public purpose" but the amount of compensation.
And, like the aftermaths of Berman and Midkiff on the federal
stage, none of these cases incited significant negative public or
legislative reaction. Perhaps the takings were less offensive
because they all involved commercial property as opposed to
private residences like those in Kelo. Regardless, the 2006
legislative session saw three rigid constitutional amendments pass
through the legislature and the public in the following September
that place further restrictions on the use of expropriation in
Louisiana.
III. THE AMENDMENT
This section discusses the final text of Amendment 5,122 which,
between its introduction and enactment, faced opposition from
119. Id. at 971-74.
120. Id. at 973 n.12 (citing LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:9021(4)-(5) (1997),
Polk v. Edwards, 626 So. 2d 1128 (La. 1993)). Note also that following these
cases and following the legislative approval of Amendment 5, the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed that economic development is a valid public purpose in
Louisiana, though the case did not involve expropriation. Bd. of Dirs. of Indus.
Dev. Bd. of Gonzales, La., Inc. v. All Taxpayers, Prop. Owners, Citizens of
Gonzales, 938 So. 2d 11 (La. 2006).
121. Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:22
(testimony of Dan Garrett, Police Jury Association of Louisiana).
122. See infra app.
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unanimously through the legislature, it passed popular vote with a
majority of only fifty-five percent.1 24 This disconnect between
Amendment 5's popularity among legislators and among voters
could suggest that whatever purpose Amendment 5 was intended
to effect was not met in its final draft. This section first analyzes
the proposed purpose of Amendment 5 and. then discusses the
textual concerns it raises.

123. These groups include: the Acadiana Economic Development Counsel,
the City of New Orleans, the City of Shreveport, the Lafayette Consolidated
Government, the Louisiana Association of Realtors, the Louisiana Conference
of Mayors, the Louisiana Municipal Association, the Police Jury Association of
Louisiana (see Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:36
(statements by Chairman Ansardi)), the Baton Rouge Area Chamber of
Commerce (see Press Release, Baton Rouge Area Chamber, Baton Rouge Area
Chamber Endorses Eight Amendments (Sept. 25, 2006), available at
http://www.brac.org/site.php?pagelD= 199&newslD=37),
the
Bureau
of
Government Research (see Alan Sayre, Louisiana Voters Consider Limits on
Government Taking of Land, 9/28/06 APALERTPOLITICS 16:44:26, Sept. 28,
2006), the Council for a Better Louisiana, the Times-Picayune, the Public
Affairs Research Council (see Editorial, Vote on Amendments, TIMES-PICAYUNE
(New Orleans), Sept. 28, 2006, at B6), and the National Federation of
Independent Business (see Mark Ballard, La. First to Vote on Expropriation: 3
Amendments Spell Out Government's Ability to Take Property,THE ADVOCATE
(Baton Rouge), Sept. 18, 2006, at Al).
124. Amendment 5 passed the Senate unanimously with two senators absent,
see La. Legislature, Senate Vote on SB 1: Final Passage (Apr. 11, 2006),
http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=380010,
passed
the House 91-3 with eleven representatives absent, see La. Legislature, House
Vote on SB 1: Final Passage (May 23, 2006), http://www.legis.state.la.us/
billdata/streamdocument.asp?did=394558, and was concurred with in the Senate
36-1 with two senators absent, see La. Legislature, Senate Vote on SB 1:
Concur (May 31, 2006), http://www.legis.state.la.us/billdata/streamdocument.
asp?did=396209. Though its author Senator Joe McPherson went on record to
predict a "well over 90%" popular vote passage, see Civil Law Committee
Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 4:04 (testimony of Sen. McPherson), the
amendment only passed with 55% of the popular vote, see Election Results,
supra note 7. See also Mark Ballard, Property Proposal's Supporters Claim
Radio Turned Tide, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Oct. 2, 2006, at A4.
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A. The Overall Purpose of Amendment 5
To understand the purpose for the several individual changes
Amendment 5 makes, it is important to understand the impetus for
Amendment 5 as a whole. The timing and debates surrounding
Amendment 5 illustrate that its impetus was to protect Louisiana
property owners against the same fate as Ms. Kelo and her coplaintiffs. 125 Representative "Peppi" Bruneau, who co-authored
Amendment 5 with Senator Joe McPherson, characterized the
bill's purpose as follows: "to prevent expropriation by a public
entity of a person's property
for economic development and to
1 26
'flip' that to a third party."
In debate, proponents spoke often and passionately of a
looming, menacing threat called "Big Box Inc." that waited to
encroach on poor, property-owning farmers and rip them from
their family homes. 127 This threat echoes those that Justice
O'Connor warned against in her dissenting Kelo opinion when she
wrote: "Nothing is to prevent the State from replacing any Motel 6
with a Ritz-Carlton, any home with a shopping mall, or any farm
with a factory."' 128 Thus, the overall purpose of the amendment
would be well characterized as an effort to codify Justice
O'Connor's dissent in Kelo.
B. Textual Concerns
The final text of Amendment 5 changes article I, section 4 in
four ways-three of which are pertinent to this Comment-and
125. See Archived Broadcasts of House of Representatives Floor Day 32,
May 23, 2006, at 3:15, available at http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/Ram/
RamMay06/06RS_Day32.ram [hereinafter House Floor, May 23] (statement by
Rep. Bruneau) ("Absent Kelo, we wouldn't be here today.").
126. Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 2:17
(statement by Rep. Bruneau); see also House Floor, May 23, supra note 125, at
2:57, 3:05 (statements by Rep. Bruneau).
127. See, e.g., Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 2:43
(statement by Rep. Mike Strain). "Big Box, Inc." is a made-up term the
politicians used to describe large corporations who presumably offer higher
taxes to the local authorities.
128. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 503 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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changes article VI, section 21. First, the amendment disallows
property from being taken either for "predominant use by" or
"transfer to" any private person or entity, except when the
purpose is industrial (that which is governed by article VI, section
21).129 Second, it limits "public purpose" to a general public
right to a definite use of property, a continuous public ownership
designated for certain enumerated uses, or an elimination of a
threat to public health or safety. 3 ° Third, it disallows economic
development, tax revenues, or any incidental benefit to the public
from being considered in determining whether a public purpose
exists. 13 1 Fourth, though unimportant for this discussion, 1 2 it
expands compensation awarded for the taking. 133 Finally,
Amendment 5 provides an exception for takings pursuant to
article VI, section 21, "industrial use" takings, to the limitations
set in article I, section 4.134
1. The "PredominantUse" Limitation
The "predominant use" limitation prevents government from
taking property for predominant use by or transfer to private
parties. 35 This sounds similar to the limitation expressed in
Calderv. Bull back in 1798, which prevented taking property from
A for transfer to B. 136 However, the extent of this limitation is in
question. What is predominant use? If government takes property
in a blighted neighborhood and leases it to a private party to
redevelop it into low income housing, a common practice today, is
that "predominant use by a private person or entity"? What if
effecting the lease was not the reason behind the taking, but was
simply the result of the taking? The word "for" could37 be read to
limit the taking's mechanism and not merely its effect. 1
129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1), reprintedinfra app.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2).
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3).
See supra note 15.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(5).
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1); LA. CONST. art. VI, § 21.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1).

136.

3 U.S. 386 (1798).

137. See Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:14
(testimony of Brian Blaesser, National Association of Realtors).
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This provision was likely included to prohibit expropriation for
private development of the type involving Big Box, Inc., discussed
above. 138 However, common practice in redevelopment projects
today involves publicly-created authorities that hire private
developers to execute or manage the development. 139 For
example, the New Orleans Superdome is public property but was
built and is maintained by a private entity with expertise in stadium
construction. 40 Even a more traditional public use, a hospital, 14is
typically built and maintained under this public-private regime.
Preventing property from being taken for "predominant use by a
private person or entity" could easily be construed to prevent even
these types of private developers from being involved in
redevelopments if expropriation is invoked.
A related concern is whether the amendment prevents mixed
use takings. These occur when the public owns part of a project
but private entities contribute their support as well. 142 The Vidalia
case discussed in Part II(D) is an example of a mixed use taking
that was widely praised. Another example of a mixed use project
in negotiation at the time Amendment 5 was passed is a proposed
It included the
cargo airport project in Ascension Parish.
construction of several privately-owned restaurants and retail
outlets that would serve to support the airport employees and
guests, but the amendment would restrict the seized private
property to use by the airport only, disallowing use by these
138. See supra Part III.A.
139. See, e.g., Archived Broadcasts of House of Representatives Civil Law
Committee Meeting, Mar. 21, 2006, http://house.louisiana.gov/rmarchive/Ram/
RamMar06/0321_06_CLP.ram [hereinafter Civil Law Committee Meeting,
March 21] (testimony of John J. Costonis, eminent domain expert). For a
thorough explanation on how public-private redevelopment partnerships work,
see Marc Mihaly, Public-PrivateRedevelopment Partnershipsand the Supreme
Court: Kelo v. City of New London, in THE SUPREME COURT AND TAKINGS:
FOUR ESSAYS 41 (Vt. J. Envtl. L. 2006), availableat http://www.vjel.org/books/
pdf/PUBS 10003.pdf.
140. Pub. Affairs Research Council of La., Inc., Guide to the Constitutional
Amendments, September 30, 2006, Ballot, Sept. 8, 2006, at 14 [hereinafter "PAR
Guide to Constitutional Amendments"].
141. See Mihaly, supra note 139.
142. "These kinds of relationships are the rule, not the exception." Mihaly,
supra note 139, at 53.
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businesses. 143 Amendment 5's ambiguous "predominant use"
language could force Louisiana's development projects into the
dark ages of urban planning by requiring these public-private
relationships and developments to be purely public.'
This would
place the state last on the list of many sophisticated developers,
by community leaders to lure them to invest
hampering efforts
145
with the state.
2. The Three "PublicPurpose" Limitations
The three definitions of "public purpose" in Amendment 5 are
no less problematic.146 The first limits public purpose to "a general
public right to a definite use of property."'
This language
originated from the Supreme Court of West Virginia in 1883 and is
part of a test proposed by Judge Green for how to determine when
a taking is constitutional if "the property is in the direct use and
occupation of a private person or of a private corporation" (i.e.,
when it is by a common carrier). 148 The first prong of his threeprong test states: "The general public must have a definite and
143. PAR Guide to Constitutional Amendments, supra note 140, at 12.
144. See, e.g., Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:29
(testimony of James Babbs, citizen of New Orleans) ("All cities of all parts of
all states at all times, we do not need unnecessary restrictions on the powers of
our parish and municipal governments to the judicious use of expropriation. It
may well turn out to be essential to the survival of communities like mine. And
it may involve the transfer of some private property to some other private
persons for their private uses.").
145. See House Floor, May 23, supra note 125, at 3:53 (debate by Rep.
Ansardi).
146. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2), reprintedinfra app:
(2) As used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI,
Section 23 of this Constitution, "public purpose" shall be limited to the
following:
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property,
(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or more
of the following objectives and uses...,
(c) The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the
existing use or disuse of the property.
147. Id. (2)(a).
148. Varner v. Martin, 21 W. Va. 534, 556, 1883 WL 3202, at *15 (W. Va.
1883). Common carriers were the only private entities engaged in takings of
property during that time. See supra Part II(A).
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fixed use of the property to be condemned, a use independent of
the will of the private person or private corporation in whom the
title of the property when condemned will be vested .... ,149
Thus, this provision appears to condone the traditional "common
carrier" use of expropriation.
One striking issue with the adoption of this clause in
conjunction with the "predominant use" clause, though it was not
raised during legislative debate, is that the origin of the language
itself implies that the property was taken "for predominant use by"
a private entity: a common carrier.
If a court reads the
"predominant use by a private person or entity" clause to apply to
all private entities, even common carriers will be prevented from
their traditional role as expropriators.
The second "public purpose" limitation provides that the taking
may be for "a continuous public ownership of the property
dedicated to one or more of [some enumerated] uses."' 50 Again,
this provision simply allows for the more traditional use of
expropriation. However, the drafters enumerate specific public
uses that could prove inflexible over time.
Further, the
"continuous public ownership" language could be interpreted to
mean that expropriated property can never be sold, even if it is
found unnecessary in a development.' 51 The hurricane recovery
149. Louisiana adopted this language in 1930 in River & Rail Terminals v.
Louisiana Railway & Navigational Co., 130 So. 337 (La. 1930). The case
states, "It is well settled that there must be a generalpublic right to a definite
use of the property, as distinguished from a use by a private individual or
corporation which may prove beneficial or profitable to some portion of the
public." Id. at 340 (emphasis added). More recent courts have not read public
purpose to be limited to this provision even in the case of common carriers. See,
e.g., Town of Vidalia v. Unopened Succession of Ruffin, 663 So. 2d 315 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1995); Tex. Pipe Line Co. v. Stein, 190 So. 2d 244 (La. App. 4th
Cir. 1966). Instead, like the federal courts, Louisiana courts have stated,
"'actual public use' is not the criteria by which public purpose is determined."
Tex. Pipe Line, 190 So. 2d at 250.
150. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(b). See infra app. for the several
enumerated uses.
151. See, e.g., Ballard, supra note 123 ("Storm-shattered neighborhoods in
New Orleans need to replace roads, sewers, natural gas lines and electricity
service. This requires billions of dollars of investment, which requires planning.
Some property necessarily needs to be taken and resold, but that likely would
not be allowed if the amendments pass, [eminent domain expert John] Costonis
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effort may be an example of an unimagined situation in which
expropriation is needed to remove ruined property and place it
back in commerce, but these inflexible parameters could handcuff
government's options. This is not the time, some say, to limit
government's authority when it comes to traditional
52
expropriation. 1
On the other hand, enumerating upwards of twenty instances in
which expropriation is allowed invites lawyers to argue that the
constitution green-lights expropriation for any purpose that
reasonably fits these definitions. 153 In other words, a political
subdivision can still take property for anything that could be
reasonably characterized as a "park," "convention center," etc., as
long as it is publicly-owned. Thus advocates for economic
development are quick to point out to property rights advocates
that this provision does little to protect property rights; it simply
54
expands the powers of government.1
The third definition of "public purpose" allows for property to
be taken if it is "a threat to public health or safety."' 5 This
language is undefined, but echoes the traditional state police
powers, even though it excludes "welfare or morals."
The
language seems to codify Justice O'Connor's preference that
'1 56
expropriation be limited to "an affirmative harm on society,"
though one could argue "a threat to public health or safety" is
57
distinct from a perhaps broader "affirmative harm on society."'

said."). This concern has also been raised in light of the right of first refusal
provision included in Amendment 6. See sources cited supra note 15.
152. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3; Civil Law Committee Meeting, March
21, supra note 139 (testimony of John J. Costonis, eminent domain expert).
153. See, e.g., Mark Ballard, Expropriation Amendment Called "Trojan
Horse "by Foe, THE ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge), Aug. 26, 2006, at Al.
154. See Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:35
(testimony of James Babbs, citizen of New Orleans).
155. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2)(c).
156. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 500 (2005) (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
157. For example, Justice O'Connor characterized the taking in Midkiff as
one that corrected the "affirmative harm" of oligopoly. Id. Oligopoly may not
be, however, a "threat to public health or safety."
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Courts could interpret this provision to prevent expropriation of
blighted neighborhoods throughout the state, which could seriously
hamper the hurricane recovery effort. 158 Laws passed in Louisiana
as recently as 2005 suggest that expropriating blighted property is
a common practice in the state and is supported by its
legislators. 159 These laws, in general, give authority to political
subdivisions to expropriate or otherwise acquire property that has
been shown to be blighted in conformity with approved parish
plans. Indeed, the cities of New Orleans and Baton Rouge, and the
parishes of St. Bernard and St. Charles, enacted redevelopment
plans pre-Katrina invoking expropriation, if necessary, for various
blighted neighborhoods in their jurisdictions. 6 0
However, the "threat to public health or safety" language does
not match the definitions of "blight" set out in the so-called "blight
statutes." Those definitions include circumstances that could be
characterized as threats to public health or safety, but also
considerations characterized as threats to public welfare or
morals. 16 1 For example, they include diversity of ownership and
defective titles as reasons why a city might want to expropriate
property. 162 If a court determines that blighted or hurricaneravaged areas are not included in the "threat to public health or
safety" exception, the amendment may have gone further towards
inhibiting economic development than originally intended.
158. See Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:13-:14
(testimony of Brian Blaesser, National Association of Realtors); Civil Law
Committee Meeting, March 21, supra note 139 (testimony of John J. Costonis,
eminent domain expert).
159. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 33:4625 (the "Parish Redevelopment
Law"), 4720-20.151, 9097.2 (2007).
160. See § 33:4720-20.151 (including the "New Orleans Community
Improvement Act," the "St. Charles Parish; Acquisition and Sale of Blighted
Property," the "St. Bernard Parish Redevelopment Law," and the "South
Burbank Crime Prevention and Development District"). Many of these laws
were effective June 21, 2005, two months before Hurricane Katrina struck, and
two days before the Kelo decision was handed down from the Court. Id.
161. See, e.g., St. Bernard Parish Redevelopment Law, § 33:4720(Q)(1)
(defining "blighted area" as a "menace to the public health, safety, morals, or
welfare").
162. Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:13
(testimony of Brian Blaesser, National Association of Realtors).
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Additionally, even if a court allows blighted-area takings, it could
construe this exception in conjunction with the "predominant use"
provision and inhibit cities from partnering with private developers
to redevelop blighted property.16
3. EliminatingEconomic Considerations
Amendment 5 also prevents courts or governing authorities
from considering economic development, tax revenues, or any
incidental benefit to the public in determining whether a proposed
expropriation contains a public purpose. 164 The amendment does
not define "economic development" nor "any incidental benefit."
If they are to be ignored when a court determines whether a public
purpose exists for a taking, what exactly are they?
The biggest difficulty with this provision is that economics
could be considered the underlying purpose of any number of
governmental takings. For example, consider one of the most
traditional public purposes: a road. Arguably, roads are principally
built for economic development because they facilitate commerce.
They also create ease of transportation to citizens, but this could be
characterized as a mere "incidental benefit" to the larger economic
development end. Since incidental benefits are also prohibited
from consideration, now the amendment has eliminated the use of
The interpretations of these two
expropriation for roads.
provisions are so uncertain that their potential effects on the future
of Louisiana's economic development projects range from
detrimental to devastating.
4. The IndustrialUse Exception
The final amendment significant to this Comment is the change
to article VI, section 23. The Amendment 5 drafters included a
163. "One of the principals that we talk about with the realtors is the
importance of government being able to play a complementary role when the
market does not intervene. That involves land assembly; that involves often
properties that are of a certain condition that the market won't enter." Civil Law
Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, at 3:19 (testimony of Brian
Blaesser, National Association of Realtors).
164. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3), reprintedinfra app.
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major exception to the limitations articulated in article I, section 4:
the industrial use exception. Article VI, section 21 already
provided that property may be taken for any industrial purpose
and transferred to a third party. 166 The changes made to the section
are: (1) that the port authorities authorized to take property are
expanded from "deep-water" ports to all "public" ports; (2) that the
section is excused from the restrictions of article I, section 4; and
fide homesteads' 67 are exempt from the industrial use
(3) that bona
68
takings. 1

The industrial use exception is significant simply because the
drafters chose to leave it in place and give it a reprieve from all the
other limitations added to article I, section 4. It is curious why the
drafters believed that industrial private parties were any more
favorable to property owners than other private parties. As one
property rights advocate put it, the amendment may disallow
Toyota from erecting a car dealership on your farmland, "but if
Toyota wants to build a plant on your property, there's nothing we
can do about that."' 69 The fact that the drafters chose to pardon
industrial use takings from the limitations added to article I,
section 4 could suggest that they concede benefits of economic
development expropriations.

165. The legislators defined "industrial," roughly, as anything not "retail."
See, e.g., Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, 2:28-:29
(testimony of Sen. McPherson).
166. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 21 (1974). An accompanying statute authorizes
political subdivisions or ports who expropriate (or in any way acquire)
properties for industrial purposes to transfer them to a third party, most likely
the attracted industry. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 33:4712.2 (2007). The statute
sets forth the limitation that the transfer must be preceded by a fourteen-day
public notice, and if five percent of the population objects, a public hearing is
held and a popular vote follows. Id.
167. The "bona fide homestead" is defined by article VII, section 20(A)(1) as
one or more tracts of land "with a residence on one tract and a field with or
without timber on it, pasture, or garden on the other tract or tracts, not exceeding
one hundred sixty acres, buildings and appurtenances, whether rural or urban,
owned and occupied by any person or persons owning the property in
indivision."
168. LA. CONST.art. VI, § 21, reprintedinfra app.
169. Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, 4:08-:09
(question to Sen. McPherson by Rep. Cravins).
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C. HurricaneRecovery: A FinalConsideration
A final, heavily-debated topic, and arguably the least resolved,
involves the effects of Amendment 5 on hurricane-ravaged South
Louisiana. Louisiana has recently suffered the worst natural
disaster in U.S. history, and the third largest hurricane disaster in
U.S. history, one after the other, in Hurricanes Katrina and Rita.
The storms left over 200,000 homes and 81,000 businesses
damaged or destroyed across the state.' 70
The effect that
Amendment 5 may have on these areas is unknown.
Property rights advocates argue that hurricane victims should
be allowed to decide for themselves what to do with their
property. 17 Many are fearful that opportunistic developers will
come from out of state and dictate how neighborhoods will be
redeveloped. They argue that if developers want to aid in the
rebuilding effort, they should enter the market through negotiation
and purchase. 172 However, as long as these outside developers
represent private industrial entities, Amendment 5 allows them to
come. 173 It also allows government to take property and turn it
into a park, a convention center, or any number of other publiclyowned lands. 174 The only thing Amendment 5 disallows is nonindustrial public-private takings that are designed to bolster the
state's economy.
Advocates for economic development caution against
hamstringing government any further in the wake of its most
criticized failure in recent history. 176 Notably, Mississippi has not
170. La. Recovery Auth. & La. Remembrance & Rebirth, HurricaneKatrina
Anniversary Data for Louisiana 3, 9 (2006), http://rememberrebirth.org/
documents/LouisianaKatrinaAnniversaryData082106.pdf.
171. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3 ("'I don't think we need social engineers
to tell us what we should do with our property,' said Rep. Peppi Bruneau, RNew Orleans, co-sponsor of the amendment. 'People have the right to build their
homes back if they want to.').
172. Id.
173. See supra Part III.B.4.
174. See supra Part III.B.2.
175. See supra Part III.B.3.
176. See, e.g., Moran, supra note 3 ("Others say the legislation could
straitjacket government at a time when it needs to find creative ways-perhaps
with the help of the private sector-to put ruined property back in commerce.
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passed limitations on its eminent domain laws in the wake of
Kelo, 177 and developers keeping track of state laws may choose
178
Mississippi over Louisiana when choosing with whom to invest.
In sum, while property rights advocates may assail government for
invoking expropriation during such a sensitive time, Amendment 5
unfortunately does not help their claim. All the amendment could
do at this point is to deprive government of its choice to do well by
its expropriation power and revitalize the economy.
Even though Amendment 5 passed popular vote on September
30, 2006, it is fraught with inconsistencies and unclear provisions
that the courts must now interpret. It is imperative that the courts
do so correctly. Many issues hang in the balance, including the
rights of property owners across the state, the state's economic
future, and the fate of the hurricane recovery effort currently
underway. Some of Amendment 5's effects were intentional and
cannot be helped. Some, however, are wholly in the hands of the
interpreter. The next section takes up the terms and provisions of
Amendment 5 that are subject to interpretive debate and
recommends how these provisions must be read together to best
protect property rights without hamstringing economic
development.
IV. ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Amendment 5 purports to protect property rights but succeeds
only in inhibiting economic development in the state.1 79 If the
overall purpose of the amendment is to codify Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Kelo,180 it should not be read to restrict expropriation any
more than she would have restricted it in her Kelo dissent. Thus,
'If I were going into a voting booth and I were from New Orleans, I would think
very hard about whether I want to deprive government of the capacity to do
things that will clearly have to be done to effectuate post-Katrina recovery,' said
John Costonis, chancellor of the Louisiana State University Law Center.").
177. See supranote 94.
178. See House Floor, May 23, supra note 125 (statement by Rep. Ansardi).
179. PAR Guide to Constitutional Amendments, supra note 140, at 12
("[J]udicial interpretations may lead to unintended consequences-detrimental
to property rights, economic development and rebuilding needs.").
180. See supra Part III.A.
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this section takes a more in-depth look at the Kelo opinion and
investigates what exactly it holds and what it does not. In light of
this purpose, this section then discusses the various Amendment 5
provisions that are subject to interpretive debate and supports
certain readings that make for a consistent furtherance of this
overall purpose.
A. The Overall Purpose ofAmendment 5
As mentioned, the overall purpose of Amendment 5 is to
prevent property from being taken for economic development and
flipped to a third party. This suggests that it is meant to ensure that
Justice O'Connor's concerns in Kelo do not transpire. It is worth
noting, however, that the Kelo majority specifically refuted the
argument that its holding would allow situations suggested by
Justice O'Connor, where one private entity is allowed to take the
property of another simply because it can pay more taxes. It did
not say, as one expert argued, that government can take your
property and build a Wal-Mart on it, ls l just for the purpose of
increased tax revenue. So before further evaluating the meanings
behind Amendment 5, it is important to understand exactly what
portions of Kelo that Amendment 5 intends to prevent.
1. BadFacts Make BadLaw
It is clear that something about the Kelo opinion offended
American property owners. More than likely, it was that the media
and others framed its result to be that the Constitution allowed
Suzette Kelo's unoffending home to be torn down to make way for
a shopping center. This was no doubt the result of the case, but it
is not the full story.
Ms. Kelo and her co-plaintiffs represented the vast minority of
property owners in the New London redevelopment area. Their
crusade to save their properties ran afoul of the best interests of the
city, as determined by intensive, careful research on the part of the
NLDC and the approval of a vast majority of its citizens. Yet these
facts were not articulated to the public through the opinion nor the
181.

Moran, supra note 3 (statement by expropriation expert Michael Rubin).
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media. As Professor Costonis remarks in his article printed in this
law review issue,
One would never know from the Kelo opinions, public
comment on them, or the Louisiana amendments that the
City of New London was seeking to address the very same
range of problems, exclusive of flooding, that beset New
Orleans-pre- and post-Katrina--on all sides: population
loss, poverty and unemployment, displacement of major
employers and industry, inferior public education and
health facilities 8 and
services, and a depressing array of
2
ills.'
urban
other
Unfortunately for the American public, one must admit that
Ms. Kelo's plight tugs insistently at the heart strings. Most of us
have homes like Ms. Kelo's charming beachfront cottage, to which
we are attached and with which we would not like to part. Yet
Marc B. Mihaly argues in his article Public-PrivateRedevelopment
Partnerships and the Supreme Court that the plaintiffs in Kelo
were dreadfully atypical parties to redevelopment condemnations
and that, in fact, actual condemnation for any redevelopment is a
rarity and condemnation of residential properties occurs even less
frequently.18 3 The reason for this is that condemnations undergo
intense public scrutiny, requiring approval by the full community
before they are ever allowed to continue. We are not told, Mihaly
argues, that regardless of what state Ms. Kelo had resided in, "the
condemnation could not have proceeded without the likely consent
of a committee representing Ms. Kelo and her neighbors." Once a
community of property owners agrees that a need exists, reason
dictates that eminent domain must be exercised to 1combat
the
84
centuries.
for
used
been
has
it
as
just
holdouts,
minority
Despite the anomalousness of the case facts, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari, decided the case based on legal precedent,

182. Costonis, supra note 15, at 377 n.96.
183. Mihaly, supra note 139, at 44. ("In those few situations where
condemnation is used, and in those even far fewer that involve residential land,
an infinitesimal number would involve condemnation of a cluster of singlefamily residences in a functioning residential neighborhood.").
184.

See supraPart II.A.
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and as the adage goes, "bad facts make bad law.' ' 1 5 Based on the
facts presented and the result they produced, public outrage
ensued:
2. Living with the Law: Kelo's Effect on Amendment 5
Notwithstanding the "bad facts" in Kelo, the majority's legal
reasoning was prudent. Recall that the Court proceeded from the
premise that "the sovereign may not take the property of A for the
sole purpose of transferring it to another private party B."'186 It
went on to say, "the City would no doubt be forbidden from taking
petitioners' land for the purpose of conferring a private benefit on
a particular private party," as such a taking would serve no
legitimate public purpose and would not withstand public
87
scrutiny. 1
Why then did Justice O'Connor argue that the majority would
188
allow the "replacing [of] any Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton"?
First, she reasoned that it is difficult for a court to determine when
a taking is intended to benefit a particular private party and when it
benefits the public,' 89 but she failed to acknowledge the vast public
scrutiny that any condemnation must undergo before it ever gets to
a court. The sensitive nature of the condemnation almost
guarantees that if hidden agendas are afoot-and even if they are
not-they will certainly be alleged and investigated. As in
Louisiana, the sovereign will already have had to prove a valid
purpose to its electorate before a judge ever reviews the case. This
explains why the Supreme Court has not yet heard a case for an
economic development taking where it found no public purpose.
Second, Justice O'Connor pointed out that even if a taking
does benefit the public incidentally, "private property is still

185. Justice Stevens himself indicated in a later speech that he disagreed with
the result in policy, but felt compelled by precedent to reach his conclusion.
Mihaly, supra note 139, at 41 n. 1 (citing Justice Weighs Desire v. Duty (Duty
Prevails), N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 25, 2005, at A1.2).
186. Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469,477 (2005).

187. Id.
188. Id. at 503.
189. Id. at 502.
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forcibly relinquished to new private ownership."' 190 However, this
reasoning ignores the legal precedents of both Berman and Midkiff
the latter of which Justice O'Connor herself authored. Both of
those cases involved the "forcible" taking of private property for
new private ownership and were decided instead on the basis of
their benefit to the public.
Public backlash following Kelo proved that between the
majority and Justice O'Connor, Justice O'Connor was most
effective in garnering public support for her opinion and reasoning.
The purpose of Amendment 5 is to apply expropriation law in
Louisiana as Justice O'Connor would have applied it in Kelo. That
is, economic development alone is not a public purpose; the public
purpose must remedy some affirmative harm in the community.
Her opinion does not, however, rule out public-private economic
development takings altogether because she does not wish to
overturn Berman. The taking in Berman involved a private
developer, just like the taking in Kelo, and one purpose for the
taking was economic revitalization of the area. The fact that
development is conducted by a private party and the private party
is one beneficiary of the development does not necessarily imply
that a valid public purpose is not also present. This affirms that
Louisiana law still allows property like that in Berman-an
economically decrepit area that is a threat to public health or
safety- to be taken, but would not allow a taking like that in Kelo,
a private development in an un-blighted area with a strictly
financial benefit.
B. TextualAnalysis
This section analyzes the text of Amendment 5 and
recommends sound judicial interpretations that will support its
purpose without devastating economic growth efforts across
Louisiana. Note, however, that some issues arise here that courts
may not be able to resolve. 19' For example, it is clear from the
amendment that the legislature intended for article VI, section 21
190. Id. at 503.
191. If a law is clear and unambiguous and does not lead to absurd
consequences, a court may not interpret it beyond its text. LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 9 (2007).
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(the industrial use exception) to be excepted out of the provisions
added to article I, section 4. Property rights advocates must simply
take comfort in the fact that an industrial expropriation cannot be
However, many
exercised against a bona fide homestead.
concerns raised by advocates for economic development can be
addressed and cushioned by court interpretation.
1. The PredominantUse Requirement
Except as specifically authorized by Article VI, Section 21
of this Constitution, property shall not be taken or damaged
by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) for predominant
use by any private person or entity; or (b) for transfer of
ownership to any private person or entity.192
This provision is arguably the most restrictive if interpreted
incorrectly. As discussed in Part III, the provision could be read
literally to prevent even common carriers from owning or using
expropriated property. If this is the case, expropriation in
Louisiana would be thrown into the nineteenth century, 193 and
5 would have an effect clearly unintended by its
Amendment
94
1
drafters.
More likely, this provision could prevent common "mixed use"
public-private developments of today and grossly retard future
developments in the state. The drafters likely meant for this
provision to protect against property being seized for transfer to the
menacing Big Box, Inc., but they disregarded or were ignorant to
the fact that redevelopment projects in Louisiana are spearheaded
by local government, not Big Box predators, and must be
supported by communities before they can go forward. 195 In
192. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(1), reprintedinfra app.
193. See supra Part II.A.2.a.
194. See Civil Law Committee Meeting, May 2, supra note 102, 2:24-:25
(statement by Sen. McPherson that expropriation by common carriers is not a
subject of controversy and should not be limited by the amendment).
195. Mihaly argues that the reason the Kelo Court was so unconvincing in its
opinion is because none of the Justices presented a clear understanding of how
modern government-assisted economic redevelopment projects work. Mihaly,
supra note 139. He argues that in today's redevelopment projects "use-by-thepublic" cannot be distinguished from private land use, nor can government
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today's redevelopments, Big Box is not the aggressor. On the
contrary, local government is the aggressor and Big Box is the tool
it uses to confer a benefit on the public. Unlike Big Box, local
government is answerable for its actions to the voting public. The
agreement it makes with Big Box is highly scrutinized and
negotiated under the watchful eye of the public and does not go
forward without public support.
"Mixed use" developments of today blur the line between who
is using the property "predominantly" and who is using it partially.
Moreover, transferring property to a developer, who then carries
out the will of the community, is common practice and an
important function of government.' 96 Reading this provision
literally would alienate any developers outside the state who seek
to invest here and effect any public-private takings now or in the
future.
Thus, courts must consider this provision as analogous to the
well-settled requirement that property cannot be taken from A for
the sole purpose of transferring it to B. In other words, courts
should interpret this provision to scrutinize a taking's effect, not its
mechanism, just as the Supreme Court did in Berman and Midkiff.
The manner in which federal courts have framed this rationale is to
say that the
transfer may not solely benefit a particular class of
97
persons. 1
To construe this language in this way, the courts must rely on
the use of the word "for" in the beginnings of each of the two
limitations: property shall not be taken for predominant use or for
transfer to any private entity. The courts must interpret this word
structure to mean that the law focuses not on the mechanism of the
taking, but on its purpose or effect. Even if the mechanism of the
taking involves "predominant use" or "transfer to" a private entity,
as long as the taking was not transacted for that reason alone, then
the taking passes this provision. As one appellate court stated, "a
use of the property by a private individual or corporation, when

motivation be distinguished from private profit; the two are too well intertwined.

Id.
196.
197.

See supra Part III.B. (Superdome example).
Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 477 (2005).
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such use is merely incidental to the public use of the property by
the state or its political198subdivision, does not destroy an otherwise
valid public purpose."'
Some may argue that this interpretation is too benign and will
not remedy the injustice of the Kelo result. However, the several
other limitations in Amendment 5 will serve that purpose. Even if
the "predominant use" provision is interpreted to scrutinize the
purpose of the taking and not the mechanism, the purpose is still
limited to the three restrictions set in article I, section 4(B)(2).
These accomplish Justice O'Connor's goal: to eliminate purely
economic public purposes by requiring an affirmative harm on
society before a government may exercise eminent domain.
The interpretation recommended herein will temper the impact
of Amendment 5 on land use planning and will present courts with
a familiar parameter under which to analyze public purpose. As
the Berman and Midkiff cases illustrate, it is not important for the
courts or a constitutional amendment to govern the mechanism of a
taking, but only to evaluate the breadth of the benefit it incurs.
2. The Three "PublicPurpose" Limitations
(2) As used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in
Article VI, Section 23 of this Constitution, "public
purpose" shall be limited to the following:
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property,
(b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to
one or more of the following objectives and uses:
(c) The removal of a threat to public health or99safety
caused by the existing use or disuse of the property.'
As explained in Part III(B)(2) above, the language in the first
"public purpose" limitation, "a general public right to a definite
use of the property," originates from jurisprudence and
traditionally applies to takings for use by common carriers. During
Amendment 5's drafting, legislators debated whether to include the
198.

Crooks v. Placid Refining Co., 903 So. 2d 1154, 1165 (La. App. 3d Cir.

2005).
199.

LA. CONST. art. I,

§ 4(B)(2), reprintedinfra app.

2008]

COMMENTS

common carrier exception in the "continuous public ownership"
section of the amendment or to give common carriers their own
exception. They concluded that since no one had ever raised an
issue as to common carriers, and since it is necessary that such
entities be authorized to exercise takings power, common carriers
should have their own exception. The language used here is
equally uncontroversial, and a court should interpret it to apply to
common carriers just as it has been applied jurisprudentially in
Louisiana since 1930.200
The provision discussing "continuous public ownership"
represents the drafters' version of the traditional public ownership
doctrine. Three concerns have been raised with it. First, these
enumerated uses are so specific that courts may be unwilling to
stretch them enough to account for unforeseen public needs, such
as those presented by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita. However, this
is unlikely
because the language used is undefined and general in
20
nature. 1
Conversely, property rights advocates fear that courts will
allow certain unintended takings to fit themselves into one of the
However, the requirement that the
enumerated uses. 202
development must be continuously owned by the public makes it
equally unlikely that any unintended takings will offend these
property-owners any more than taking property for a convention
center or museum would. 203 As long as it is publicly owned, the
taking cannot be more traditional than that.
A third concern is more important. Takings for large-scale
redevelopment projects, such as those that will be part of the
hurricane recovery, will necessarily involve taking property
200. See supra Part III.B.2.

201. See LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(2) (e.g., "other public transportation,"

"navigational protection," "recreational facilities," "public utilities").

202. See supra Part III.B.2.
203. Notably, the drafters' inclusion of "convention center" as an enumerated
use suggests that of the three cases in which a private economic development
taking has occurred in Louisiana, the legislature supported at least two. Both
NOEHA and Chanse Gas were takings for the purpose of building convention
centers. See supra Part II.D. This suggests the legislature approved of the
results in these cases, if not their reasoning. Though there is no evidence that
the legislature sought to overturn the third case, Vidalia, the case was not
mentioned in legislative debate as one that offended the public.
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without putting all of it to public use. It is possible that the
"continuous public ownership" provision could inhibit
government's ability to properly plan the redevelopment because
unused land may not be resold, and wooed private developers, not
wanting to get stuck with the bill, will not come to the table.
Courts should therefore construe this language to be binding
only insofar as the taking is planned. In other words, as long as the
land is intendedfor continuous public ownership, a court should
find a sufficient public purpose. Courts can study planning
documents and uses of surrounding property to determine the
expropriator's intent.2°4
Some may argue that limiting the provision to this
interpretation could encourage government to feign certain
intentions prior to any kind of taking and then resell the property to
Big Box. Again, this ignores the intense public scrutiny any taking
undergoes. Further, another constitutional provision prohibits this:
Newly amended article I, section 4(G) requires that any
expropriated property not used for its designated purpose must be
offered back to the original owner20at
fair market value within two
5
years of completion of the project.
Finally, the "threat to public health or safety" exception
represents the only extension of "public purpose" that Amendment
5 allows beyond the traditional public uses.2 0 6 It is a relatively
narrow extension but affirms the theory that Amendment 5's
purpose was to codify Justice O'Connor's dissent in Kelo. As
mentioned, the only difference between her dissent and
204. The expropriator for purposes such as sewage and electricity will not
necessarily be a sovereign. Various energy companies, telephone companies,
and water and sewage plants are among a select group of private entities that
have been granted expropriation powers by statute. See, e.g., PAR Guide to
Constitutional Amendments, supra note 140, at 10.
205. 2006 La. Acts No. 859. As has been mentioned, this is a hugely
confining requirement that warrants its own study outside the scope of this
Comment. Nonetheless, it is the law and will surely curb or perhaps transform
the expropriation process in the future. See Costonis, supra note 15, at 383-85
(likening the right of first refusal provision to a "poison pill" in a "corporate
take-over attempt" given its public auction requirement and 30-year duration,
but positing that possible loopholes include structuring the transfer as a
501 (c)(3) donation or an article VII, section 14(C) cooperative endeavor).
206. LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3).
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Amendment 5 is that she would require an "affirmative harm on
society" rather than the arguably more narrow "threat to public
health or safety." If a court interprets the language to be the same
as Justice O'Connor's "affirmative harm on society," then
Louisiana's blight statutes could remain.
Public health and safety are two elements of the familiar police
power afforded to states: that of protecting the public's health,
safety or welfare, and sometimes morals. When speaking of the
police power, health and safety are rarely separated from welfare.
The fact that the Amendment 5 drafters separated them in
Amendment 5 is a strong argument that they intended to draw a
distinction between the extent of the expropriation power and the
extent of the police power in this state.
Justice O'Connor made the same distinction in her Kelo dissent
when she lamented the link the Court drew between the two
powers in Berman and Midkiff.2 7 The reason she does not go on
to propose defining public purpose as a removal of a threat to
public health or safety, and not welfare, is likely that she could not
frame the holding in Midkiff as such. Justice O'Connor herself
described the oligopoly in Midkiff as an "injury to the public
welfare and tranquility." She could not stretch that fact-pattern to
find a threat to health or safety. From this one could draw one of
two conclusions: (1) Justice O'Connor would have limited public
purpose as a threat to public health or safety had she not been
207. See Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 501-02 (2005)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("There is a sense in which this troubling result
follows from errant language in Berman and Midkiff. In discussing whether
takings within a blighted neighborhood were for a public use, Berman began by
observing: 'We deal, in other words, with what traditionally has been known as
the police power.' 348 U.S., at 32, 75 S. Ct. 98. From there it declared that
'[o]nce the object is within the authority of Congress, the right to realize it
through the exercise of eminent domain is clear.' Id., at 33, 75 S. Ct. 98.
Following up, we said in Midkiff that '[t]he "public use" requirement is
coterminous with the scope of a sovereign's police powers.' 467 U.S., at 240,
104 S. Ct. 2321. This language was unnecessary to the specific holdings of
those decisions. Berman and Midkiff simply did not put such language to the
constitutional test, because the takings in those cases were within the police
power but also for 'public use' for the reasons I have described. The case before
us now demonstrates why, when deciding if a taking's purpose is constitutional,
the police power and 'public use' cannot always be equated.")
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bound by her own words in Midkiff or (2) Justice O'Connor
concedes that certain conditions, such as a concentration of land
ownership which are not necessarily injurious to health or safety,
are still worthy circumstances in which to invoke the Takings
Power.
Admittedly, however, Amendment 5's phrasing is clear, and
likely not subject to interpretive debate. It would be difficult for a
court to read "threat to public health or safety" to allow a taking
that benefits the public's welfare when that word is so pointedly
absent. Therefore, one must concede that certain situations which
in the past have spurred municipalities to expropriate blighted
properties-concentrations of land ownership or invalid titles, for
example-no longer warrant expropriation in Louisiana.
One question is left to interpretive analysis: when the taking
would disrupt a threat to public health or safety, though there does
not already exist a harm, is the taking valid under Amendment 5?
The use of the word "threat" necessarily implies that the harm may
occur in the future. Thus, for example, a hurricane-ravaged
neighborhood in New Orleans that is cleaned and gutted, but still
abandoned, could be characterized as a "threat" to public safety
because abandoned buildings tend to attract vagrancy and criminal
activity.
If government is going to be allowed its expropriation power to
rebuild neighborhoods in the wake of the storm, it must do so
under the threat to public health or safety exception, because
otherwise the acquired land would have to remain public, common
carrier, or industrial property. Courts must not allow the "threat to
public health or safety" provision to prevent expropriation in the
hurricane recovery effort.
Expropriation is a necessary practice for government to effect
redevelopment in decrepit or destroyed municipalities, even if an
effect of the taking is economic. As Professor Costonis states, "To
collapse the values associated with combating the[] ills [in New
London at the time of Kelo and in New Orleans today] into
something called 'economic development' is as callous as
portraying the city as a behemoth running roughshod over its
undefended citizens ....
,208 Where homes remain abandoned and
208.

Costonis, supra note 15, at 377 n.96.
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undeveloped, government must be able to expropriate the region
and contract with developers to execute a revitalization plan.
Some have argued that if one or two homeowners in a
neighborhood redevelop, then the entire neighborhood will be
restricted from redevelopment because the individual redeveloped
homes are not threats to public health or safety. 20 9 However, as
this Comment has argued, Amendment 5 does not overturn
Berman, which states that a municipality may evaluate a region as
a whole, and not individual properties therein, to determine if a
taking is warranted. 210 Nothing in Amendment 5 states that a
particular plot of land must be evaluated separately from its
neighbors. A court should not read a requirement into Amendment
5 that is not already there.
3. EliminatingEconomic Considerations
(3) Neither economic development, enhancement of tax
revenue, or any incidental benefit to the public shall be
considered in determining whether the taking or damaging
of property is for a public purpose pursuant to
Subparagraph (1) of this
Paragraph or Article VI, Section
2
23 of this Constitution. 1
Finally, Amendment 5 takes economic development, tax
revenues, or "any incidental benefit to the public" out of the
determining factors of whether a public purpose exists. 2 12 As
mentioned, Justice O'Connor did not disdain economic
development as a factor in determining public purpose; she simply
disapproved of its employ as the sole factor.
Economic
development is not an evil governmental end. In Louisiana's case
especially, it is one of its most fundamental and important goals.
Louisiana has been at the bottom of the economic totem pole
for too long. 213 By passing Amendment 5, its proponents have
made known that their priorities lay elsewhere. They purport to be
209.
210.
211.
212.
213.

PAR Guide to Constitutional Amendments, supra note 140, at 13.
See supra Part II.A.
LA. CONST. art. I, § 4(B)(3).
Id.
See House Floor, May 23, supra note 125 (statement by Rep. Ansardi).
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fighting a phantom threat of property right infringement (that is not
industrial in nature),214 but this threat is well contained.2 15
Disengaging government from economic development is an
unnecessary sacrifice in Louisiana's reaction to Kelo.
Fortunately, the provision can be read as. unnecessary. With
the restrictions in section 4(B)(2) already in place, a public purpose
must involve either a traditional use or a threat to public health or
safety. The benefits to the public in both of those will include
more than straight economics. The only way in which this
provision can serve to further hamper economic development is if
it is applied in the absurd manner mentioned in Part III(B)(3)
above-that even a road is an invalid public purpose because it
extends an economic benefit.
Courts have broad discretion in interpreting these last two
provisions and are urged to exercise it. Both provisions should be
read narrowly and should not be used as barriers to economic
development takings that result in benefits to the public.
Because Amendment 5 prevents economic development,
increased tax revenue, or any incidental benefits to the public from
being considered in determining public purpose, a court must
lower the standard of scrutiny for determining when a taking
furthers a legitimate governmental end. As this Comment makes
clear, expropriations in Louisiana occur only when absolutely
necessary for public benefit. They pass strict public scrutiny
before ever entering a court of law. If state and local authorities,
and a community at large support a taking, and the government can
show that the taking is rationally related to a removal of a threat to
public health or safety, then the court must not stand in the way of
economic development simply because it is a predominant (and
positive) effect of the taking.
V. CONCLUSION

The U.S. Supreme Court decision in Kelo shocked the nation,
but not all of its facts were presented to the public. Louisiana's
reaction was knee-jerk and resulted in inconsistent provisions that
214. See supra Part III.A.
215. See supra Part II.D.
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fail to add protections for property-owners in the state. Instead, the
amendment could be read to hamstring public-private economic
development and further disrupt an already struggling hurricane
recovery effort. Public-private developments are not the enemy.
Local governments rely on, and indeed seek out, private dollars to
nurture and repair neighborhoods. Political processes ensure that
these projects obtain overwhelming community support before
they go forward, and that the results are beneficial. Amendment 5
must not be read to prevent these projects just because they involve
parties that seek a profit. The public too seeks a profit in entering
into agreement with them: economic development. It is therefore
imperative that courts across the state interpret the provisions of
Amendment 5 as herein recommended. Louisiana's economic
future depends on it.
Jennie Jackson Miller*

* The author would like to thank Professor John Devlin and Chancellor
Emeritus John Costonis for their invaluable feedback, and her husband, Edward,
for steadfastly feigning interest in eminent domain law.
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APPENDIX
Amendment 5 amends article I, section 4(B) to state (bold and underlined words
added):
ARTICLE I. DECLARATION OF RIGHTS

§4. Right to Property
(B)(f Property shall not be taken or damaged by the state or its political
subdivisions except for public purposes and with just compensation paid to
the owner or into court for his benefit. Except as specifically authorized by
Article VI. Section 21 of this Constitution property shall not be taken or
damaged by the state or its political subdivisions: (a) for predominant
use by any private person or entity; or (b) for transfer of ownership to
any private person or entity.
(2) As used in Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph and in Article VI.
Section 23" of this Constitution "public purpose" shall be limited to the
following:
(a) A general public right to a definite use of the property,
b) Continuous public ownership of property dedicated to one or
more of the following obiectives and uses:
(i) Public buildings in which publicly funded services are
administered, rendered, or provided.
(i) Roads, bridges, waterways, access to public waters and lands, and
other public transportation, access, and navigational systems available
to the general public.
(ii) Drainage, flood controL levees, coastal and navigational protection
and reclamation for the benefit of the public generally.
(iv) Parks. convention centers museums, historical buildings, and
recreational facilities generally open to the public.
(v) Public utilities for the benefit of the public generally.
(vi) Public ports and public airports to facilitate the transport of goods
or persons in domestic or international commerce.
(c) The removal of a threat to public health or safety caused by the
existing use or disuse of the property.
(3) Neither economic development, enhancement of tax revenue, or
any incidental benefit to the public shall be considered in determinin!
whether the taking or damaging of property is for a public purpose
*

Article VI, section 23 grants local governments the power to expropriate for

public purposes:
§23. Acquisition of property.
Section 23. Subject to and not inconsistent with this constitution and
subject to restrictions provided by general law, political subdivisions may
acquire property for any public purpose by purchase, donation, expropriation,
exchange, or otherwise.
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pursuant to Subparagraph (1) of this Paragraph or Article VI, Section
23 of this Constitution.
f4i Property shall not be taken or damaged by any private entity authorized
by law to expropriate, except for a public and necessary purpose and with
just compensation paid to the owner; in such proceedings, whither the
purpose is public and necessary shall be a judicial question.
() In every expropriation or action to take property pursuant to the
provisions of this Section, a party has the right to trial by jury to determine
whether the compensation is just, and the owner shall be compensated to
the full extent of his loss. Except as otherwise provided in this
Constitution, the full extent of loss shall include, but not be limited to
the appraised value of the property and all costs of relocation,
inconvenience, and any other damages actually incurred by the owner
because of the expropriation.
(6) No business enterprise or any of its assets shall be taken for the purpose
of operating that enterprise or halting competition with a government
enterprise. However, a municipality may expropriate a utility within its
jurisdiction.
Amendment 5 also amends article VI, section 21 to read (bold and underline
words added; struck through words deleted):
ARTICLE VI. LOCAL GOVERNMENT
§21. Assistance to Local Industry
(A) Authorization. In order to (1) induce and encourage the location of or
addition to industrial enterprises therein which would have economic impact
upon the area and thereby the state, (2) provide for the establishment and
furnishing of such industrial plant, (3) facilitate the operation of public
ports, or (3) (4) provide movable or immovable property, or both, for
pollution control facilities, the legislature by law may authorize, subject to
restrictions it may impose, any political subdivision, deep water RMl port
commission, or deep-water publi port, harbor, and terminal district to:
(a) issue bonds, subject to approval by the State Bond Commission or its
successor, and use the funds derived from the sale ofthe bonds to acquire and
improve industrial plant sites and other property necessary to the purposes
thereof,
(b) acquire, through purchase, donation, exchange, and (subject to .eAri
I, Seetien 4) expropriation, and improve industrial plant buildings and
industrial plant equipment, machinery, furnishings, and appurtenances,
including public port facilities and operations which relate to or
facilitate transportation of goods in domestic and international
commerce; and
(c) sell, lease, lease-purchase, or demolish all or any part of the foregoing.
(D) Property excepted. The bona fide homestead, as defined by
Article VII, Section 20(A)(1), shall not be suboect to expropriation
pursuant to this Section.

